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Brands, Product Differentiation and EU Competition Law 
 
Ioannis Lianos 
 
Abstract 
 
The paper explores how EU competition law has integrated so far the concept 
of brands in different areas of enforcement. Although EU competition law has 
engaged in multiple instances with branding and product differentiation, 
brands do not yet constitute an operational concept in EU competition law. 
This is due to an important uncertainty as to the normative choices that need 
to be made with regard to the relation between brands and the formation of 
consumer preferences. The concerns raised by retailer power and the 
development of private labels also indicate that the existing economic theory 
on product differentiation may not also provide a complete picture on the 
effects of brands on the competitive process and ultimately on consumers. 
Competition law will also need to tackle the issues raised by the development 
of ‘social branding’ and the dialogic interaction between brand owners and 
consumers in the constitution of their brand identity. 
 
Keywords: Brand, Product Differentiation, Advertising, Branding, Social 
Brands, Monopolistic Competition, Imperfect Competition, Consumer Choice, 
Consumer Welfare, Private Labels, Veblen Goods, Market Power, Franchise, 
Selective Distribution, Competition, Antitrust, Brand Loyalty  
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Brands, Product Differentiation and EU Competition Law 
 
Ioannis Lianos1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The term of the art ‘brands’ is often used in EU Competition law with the aim 
of providing factual information on the competitive, or not, relation between 
products or services provided by different economic actors. The Commission 
often refers in its merger or antitrust decisions to the products (or services) of 
brand X that enter in competition on a relevant market with the products (or 
services) of brand Y. The term brand used in this context aims to provide a 
factual observation on the operation of the specific relevant market. No further 
inferences are made. Inquiring into the role of brands in this context is a 
simple exercise and offers little to the research question explored in this 
volume. The issue becomes, however, more complex if one engages with the 
use of brands as an operational concept in EU competition law. Operational 
concepts connect theoretical concepts to simple factual observations. For 
instance, the operational concept of ‘market power’ connects a fact over the 
level of prices in a specific market at a certain point in time, which is partially 
an observable fact, with the theoretical construction of price theory, say for 
instance the theoretical concept of monopoly or its antithesis, that of perfect 
competition, from which market power is a departure. These operational 
concepts help decision-makers to make inferences (they serve as analytical 
shortcuts) about the relation between the different facts they observe in order 
to assess causal relations and make predictions. 
 
It is now accepted that competition law makes an extensive use of operational 
concepts transplanted from the discipline of economics, in particular 
neoclassical price theory2. Yet, its receptivity to operational concepts 
developed in other disciplines, management studies in particular, has been 
relatively limited. And here lies the core of the problem with regard to the 
engagement of EU competition law with the concept of ‘brands’. Although the 
discipline of economics and in particular neoclassical price theory perceives 
brands as a fact of economic life, price theory has not made use until recently 
of the term as an operational concept. Instead, economists prefer to focus on 
                                                          
1
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the semi-operational concept of product differentiation3, advertising4 or that of 
barriers to entry, which describe the consequences of the existence of brands, 
but do not engage directly with the concept of brand. However, marketing 
studies use ‘brands’ as an operational concept. Brands also extend to more 
than product differentiation, as they may be used by brand-owners in order to 
reinforce the “emotional and cognitive appeal” of a certain brand to 
consumers, as this is well explained in several of the contributions to this 
volume5. 
 
One of the possible reasons of this relatively low analytical value of the 
concept of brand in neoclassical price theory comes from the relative 
ambiguity of the policy prescriptions of the theoretical models of ‘imperfect 
competition’ and ‘monopolistic competition’ which were the first to fully engage 
with product differentiation in the welfare economics tradition and to discuss 
the role of brands in the competitive process. 
 
Although not ignored by Marshall, product differentiation really became the 
focus of economic inquiry starting in the 1930s. Two positions emerged in the 
literature. Relying on the welfare economics paradigm and having as a 
starting point for the analysis the concept of ‘industries’ producing a 
single/homogeneous commodity, Robinson’s Economics of Imperfect 
Competition viewed product differentiation as a departure from the ideal of 
perfect competition, hence the use of the term ‘imperfect’ to qualify the 
situation of product heterogeneity, the term ‘imperfect’ indicating the direction 
to go (that of ‘perfect’ competition)6. In his Theory of Monopolistic 
Competition, Chamberlin took a different perspective, focusing on the concept 
of firm, rather than that of industry and viewing product differentiation as a 
normal fact of economic life, the concept of monopolistic competition 
describing the process of many sellers who produce heterogeneous products 
in response to divergent demands and preferences of consumers7. 
Chamberlin noted that 
 
the consequences of product heterogeneity for welfare economics 
have been either ignored or seriously misunderstood. Monopoly 
elements are built into the economic system and the ideal necessarily 
                                                          
3
 Semi-operational as it describes an observable fact as well as serving the function of an 
operational concept. 
4
 Which includes money spent on brands.  It is also recognized that brands can be a source 
of across sub-market ‘linkage”. See, J. Sutton, Technology and Market Structure – Theory 
and History (MIT Press, 2001), chapters 11 and 12. 
5
 See, for instance, Chapter 12 by Andrew Griffiths, noting that “the identity that a brand 
confers on products gives a context to an individual act of consumption which may increase 
its emotional impact and turn it into the basis of a continuing relationship” and that “branding 
can transform a product into a source of self-assurance or a means of self-expression or a 
symbol of status or of adherence to certain values”. 
6
 J. Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect Competition (London: Macmillan, 1933). 
7
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involves them. Thus wherever there is a demand for diversity of 
product, pure competition turns out to be not the ideal but a departure 
from it8. 
 
According to Chamberlin, ‘if heterogeneity is part of the welfare ideal, there is 
no prima facie case for doing anything at all’, the choice to be made being 
ultimately that of a ‘less heterogeneous output as against a smaller, more 
heterogeneous one’9. This brings to the fore the idea that price is not the only, 
or the most important, parameter of competition and that quality and variety 
may also constitute important parameters one should take into account10. 
 
These contrasting views over product differentiation reflect the difficulties of 
‘brands’ and ‘brand theory’ to gain acceptance as a useful operational concept 
in competition law11. This chapter aims, first, to discuss the difficult normative 
choices that would entail the integration of ‘brands’ in the toolbox of 
competition authorities and the courts, in particular in view of the goals 
pursued by EU competition law, and, second, to describe instances in which 
the concept of brands played an important role in the competition assessment 
conducted under EU competition law, and the limits it faced. 
 
NORMATIVE CHOICES 
 
One of the most difficult issues to resolve when discussing about the added 
value offered by the concept of brand in competition law has to do with the 
role of consumers in the process of product differentiation that is inherent in 
the existence of brands. In competition law, the aim of protecting consumers 
implies that the outcome/consequences of a specific practice on consumers 
matters, before any decision on the lawfulness or unlawfulness of this practice 
has been reached. A different approach would take a deontological 
perspective and would emphasize competitive rivalry, irrespective of any 
                                                          
8
 E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, The American Economic 
Review, 40(2) (1950), 85-92, 92. 
9
 E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, The American Economic 
Review, 40(2) (1950), 85-92, 89-90. Two basic formalizations of product heterogeneity 
emerged in economics. The spatial model, which treats competition as a localized 
phenomenon, the assumption being that ‘consumers purchase a limited number of brands 
(often one) from a small subset that are most preferred’ and the representative consumer 
model, according to which ‘a representative consumer purchases many brands, varying the 
proportions of each according to their prices and exogenously given utility weights’: J.M. 
Perloff and S.C. Salop, Equilibrium with Product Differentiation, Review of Economic Studies, 
(1985), 107-20. 
10
 Despite the different focus and policy prescriptions, Chamberlin’s theory forms nevertheless 
part of the neoclassical price paradigm and shares with perfect competition “the common 
neoclassical hard core”: see S. J. Latsis, “Situational Determinism in Economics”, The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 23(3) (1972), 207-245. 
11
 Although one should note the considerable progress that product differentiation based 
oligopoly models brought to merger control and all other areas of competition law from the 
early 1980s on. Yet, these models do not engage systematically with the psychological aspect 
of consumer behaviour and the formation of consumer preferences, for instance the 
emotional and cognitive appeal of brands. 
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actual or potential consequences of the specific practice/conduct on 
consumers or other protected interests, or some other ‘political objective’, 
such as in the EU context, the construction of an Internal Market. So the 
question one should ask how the constitution of brands and branding in 
general affects the interests that the specific competition law aims to protect.  
 
Taking, for the benefits of comparison with other competition law regimes, the 
interests of consumers as a starting point12, one needs to take into account 
that there are various possible normative assumptions as to the relation 
between brands and consumer interest in this context. 
 
If one takes the perspective of price theory, the protection of consumer 
surplus, the consumer part of the deadweight loss suffered as a result of the 
restriction of competition, will constitute the main focus of the analysis. As the 
development of a brand involves fixed costs that need to be recuperated over 
time, firms will not invest on it unless they are able to charge higher than 
competitive prices13. A price increase might lead to a volume effect that would 
be suffered by a certain category of consumers: because of the price increase 
some consumers will not be able to buy the product anymore, although past 
consumption patterns (revealed preferences) indicate that they would have 
preferred to do so, had the price not increased. Under this narrow definition of 
consumer surplus, the overcharge paid by the consumers, as a result of the 
price increase, should not be of concern for competition law enforcement, as it 
constitutes a wealth transfer from the buyers to the sellers. The suppliers may 
be in a position to compensate (hypothetically, not actually) the loss that 
consumers have suffered while still being able to compensate with this wealth 
transfer their own losses following the volume effect (producer surplus). 
Hence, if branding provides opportunities for more intensive product 
differentiation, this should not necessarily be a concern for competition law, 
even if that product differentiation leads to higher prices for certain categories 
of consumers, when, after factoring in the volume effect, it has also the effect 
to increase the profits of the brand owners to an extent that any loss of 
consumer surplus could be (hypothetically) covered. This is not the approach 
taken by EU Competition Law, in view of the emphasis it puts on the fact that, 
to be justified, restrictions to competition should at least be neutral from the 
point of view of those consumers directly or likely affected by the restrictive 
agreement 14. One may also advance that product differentiation may reduce 
                                                          
12
 I. Lianos, Some reflections on the objectives of EU competition law, in I. Lianos, and D. 
Geradin (Eds.), Handbook in EU Competition Law: Substantive Aspects (Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar), 1-85. 
13
 This is an assumption that may not always prove correct, as I will show later with the 
discussion over private labels, as in reality as the introduction of a new brand may allow all 
firms to raise prices but an increase in competing brands of products may also tend to lower 
prices, as the firm would lose sales to the new brand (cannibalize its sales) and rival’s 
promotional activities may increase demand for the category or steal customers. 
14
 Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C 101/97, 
paras 85. Although the Commission accepts that consumer harm assessed under Article 
101(1) TFEU (e.g. higher prices) might be compensated by some benefits provided by the 
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output, the classic dilemma being that of a ‘less heterogeneous output as 
against a smaller, more heterogeneous one’, in which case a total welfare 
standard approach would view branding with suspicion. 
 
The matrix changes if we move beyond consumer surplus and include in the 
analysis the wealth transfer that consumers may have incurred because of the 
overcharges that resulted from the development of brands and increased 
product differentiation. These may not only relate to higher prices but could 
also cover any other parameter of competition, such as quality, variety, 
innovation. In this case, both the loss of consumer surplus and wealth 
transfers will be compared to the total efficiency gains pertaining to the 
supplier(s), thus enabling a cost benefit analysis of the effect of the conduct 
on the welfare of a specific group of market actors, direct and indirect 
consumers. In this case, one may argue that branding and the product 
differentiation that ensues may enable the brand owner to increase the price 
of the branded good and thus to collect additional rents from the consumers 
that continue purchasing her products. The implicit counterfactual is that, in 
the absence of the brand and product differentiation, this price increase and 
the exploitation of this category of consumers would not have been possible. 
The assumption here is that brands and product differentiation lead to an 
increased ability and incentive for brand owners to increase prices for 
consumers that do not switch to other brands or competing products 
(inframarginal consumers). 
 
Some authors also argue that competition authorities should aim to preserve 
an optimal level of ‘consumer choice’, defined as ‘the state of affairs where 
the consumer has the power to deﬁne his or her own wants and the ability to 
satisfy these wants at competitive prices’15. They use interchangeably the 
term of ‘consumer sovereignty’, which is defined as ‘the set of societal 
arrangements that causes that economy to act primarily in response to the 
aggregate signals of consumer demand, rather than in response to 
government directives or the preferences of individual businesses’16. 
Consumer sovereignty may be preserved as the ability of consumers to 
influence the characteristics of the product bundle according to their own 
“hypothetical” revealed preferences. Hypothetical revealed preference theory 
defines an agent’s preferences in terms of what she would choose if she were 
able to choose, thus switching from actual to hypothetical choice17. The way 
this theory will work in practice is still a matter of speculation. It is clear that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
anticompetitive agreement assessed under Article 101(3) (‘efficiency gains’), they require that 
these benefits effectively (and not only hypothetically) and fully compensate the consumer 
harm in a way or another. 
15
 R.H Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, University of Pittsburgh 
Law Review, 62(3) (2001), 503-25, 503. 
16
 N.W. Averitt and R. H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and 
Consumer Protection Law, Antitrust Law Journal, 65 (1997) 713-56, 715 . 
17
 For a critical analysis see, D.M. Hausman Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012), 31-3. 
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consumers are influenced in their decisions by ‘the context of choice, defined 
by the set of options under consideration. In particular, the addition and 
removal of options from the offered set can influence people’s preferences 
among options that were available all along’18. The firms with their marketing 
activities may, for example, shape endogenously consumer preferences by 
establishing an artificial selection process, ‘preferences are actually 
constructed—not merely revealed’19.  A greater focus on consumer 
sovereignty may thus, in some cases, lead to more intensive competition law 
intervention to establish the parameters of independent consumer choice and 
specific presumptions against commercial practices that deny the sovereignty 
of consumer choice. The consumer choice or consumer sovereignty standard 
may also accommodate the psychological aspect of the formation of these 
preferences, which is usually ignored in neoclassical price theory.  
 
Transposing this debate over the issue of branding, it becomes essential to 
explore the origins of product differentiation. If product differentiation 
constitutes a natural outgrowth of consumer preferences, to which firms tend 
to respond by developing different brands, then one may argue that brands 
promote consumer choice20. If, however, product differentiation constitutes a 
way to manipulate consumer preferences, this may contradict the consumer 
sovereignty principle and brands may be perceived as limiting consumer 
choice; hence, the need to understand how brands relate to consumer 
preferences, should the aim of competition law be the protection of the 
interest of consumers. 
 
Similar concerns have also been expressed for another technique of product 
differentiation: advertising. As Kyle Bagwell argues in his study over the 
Economic Analysis of Advertising, advertising was ‘almost entirely a 20th 
century project’, in view of the focus of economic theory in the nineteenth 
century on the development of the perfect competition theory, which suggests 
no role for product differentiation21. Economic theory on advertising emerged 
                                                          
18
 E. Shafir, I. Simonson and A. Tversky, Reason-Based Choice, (1993) 49 Cognition 11-36, 
21. 
19
 Ibid., p. 34. 
20
 This seems to have been the view of E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public 
Policy, The American Economic Review, 40(2) (1950), 85-92, 86, according to whom 
‘‘monopoly is necessarily a part of the welfare norm. In abstract terms it seems to follow very 
directly from the recognition that human beings are individuals, diverse in their tastes and 
desires, and moreover widely dispersed spatially. Insofar as demand has any force as a guide 
to production, one would expect entrepreneurs to appeal to them in diverse ways, and thus to 
render the output of the economy correspondingly heterogeneous, using this term in its 
broadest sense to embrace not only the qualitative aspects of the product itself, but also the 
conditions surrounding it’s sale, including spatial location. And since what people want-an 
elaborate system of consumers' preferences-is the starting point in welfare economics, their 
wants for a heterogeneous product would seem to be as fundamental as anything could be. 
Heterogeneity as between producers is synonymous with the presence of monopoly; 
therefore monopoly is necessarily a part of the welfare ideal’.  
21
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, pp. 1-2. See, for instance,   
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with Marshall in the late decade of the nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century and later developed in three distinct periods, depending on the 
dominant conception of the function advertising plays in relation to consumer 
preferences22.  
 
During the first period, economists perceived advertising as a tool to alter 
consumer preferences and to create product differentiation and brand loyalty, 
driving the demand curve of the advertised product to become more inelastic 
and thus leading to higher prices for consumers. The dominant perception at 
the time was that advertising led to a waste of resources, and had an ‘entry-
deterrence effect’, as it aimed to manipulate the preferences of the consumers 
in favour of the products of a particular firm (‘the persuasive view’)23. 
Consumer preferences were thus endogenously determined. Joan Robinson 
represented this view when she argued that ‘the customer will be influenced 
by advertisement, which plays upon his mind with studied skill, and makes 
him prefer the goods of one producer to those of another because they are 
brought to his notice in a more pleasing or more forceful manner’24. Empirical 
work has confirmed some of the intuitions of the ‘persuasive view’. Comanor 
and Wilson performed a multi-variate regression analysis of the averaged 
profits of manufacturers in 41 consumer-good industries for a period of three 
years and found ‘empirical support for the conclusion that the heavy volume of 
advertising expenditures in some industries serves as an important barrier to 
new competition in the markets served by these industries’25. More recently, 
with regard to product differentiation Bronnenberg et al highlighted that 
brands, advertising, or other past experiences and social milieu, such as 
childhood, lead to ‘preference capital’, which could be a valuable asset for 
incumbent firms and a source of long-term economic rents for them26. This 
                                                          
22
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, p. 3. 
23
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, p. 9. 
24
 J. Robinson, Economics of Imperfect Competition (London, Macmillan 1933), p. 90. Among 
the different authors listed in the ‘persuasive view’ K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of 
Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, Columbia University, Department of Economics, 
August 2005, includes D. Braithwaite, The Economic Effects of Advertisement, Economic 
Journal, 38 (1928), 16-37 (arguing that advertising may help to create ‘reputational 
monopolies’ while it has a modest quality-guarantee effect); N.V. Kaldor, The Economic 
Aspects of Advertising, Review of Economic Studies, 18 (1950), 18, 1-27 (arguing that 
advertising provides a modest degree of information while wasting resources and that it also 
enhances concentration, as because of the economies of scale in advertising only the most 
profitable and larger firms are able to finance larger advertising expenditures and to develop 
direct connection with the consumers, by-passing other middlemen, such as retailers); J.S. 
Bain, Barriers to New Competition: Their Character and Consequences in Manufacturing 
Industries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), (noting that product 
differentiation constitutes the most important entry barrier and that advertising is the primary 
source of product differentiation); J.K. Galbraith, The Affluent Society, (Boston, MA: 
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1958) (criticizing the passive role of consumers in the process). 
25
 W.S. Comanor and T. A. Wilson, Advertising and Market Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1974), p. 239. 
26
 Bart J. Bronnenberg, J.-PH. Dubé, M. Grentzkow, The Evolution of Brand Preferences: 
Evidence from Consumer Migration, American Economic Review, 102(6) (2012), 2472–2508. 
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explains, according to these authors, why consumers have high willingness to 
pay for particular brands, even when the alternatives are objectively similar27. 
This evidence indicates that brand loyalty may not always be a natural 
outgrowth of consumer preferences and that there is value for firms to use 
advertising, branding or other forms of product differentiation in order to 
establish some form of ‘preference capital’. This strategy may generate high 
willingness to pay for consumers and presumably steady economic rents for 
the incumbents in the future, without that being justified by the objective 
characteristics of their product/or service in comparison to the 
products/services of a new entrant. In other words, incumbent firms may have 
the incentives and the ability to alter the utility function of consumers in order 
to increase their profits. From this may result possible distortions of 
competition, which according to Nick Economides may fall into three 
categories:  
 
(f)irst competition in perception advertising may result in a larger 
number of brands at equilibrium than is optimal. Second, the tie in 
produces an allocative distortion. Third, resources are wasted in the 
effort to link desired mental images with advertised goods28. 
 
A different approach is advanced by the proponents of the ‘informative view’29, 
which consider that the principal function of advertising is to convey 
information to consumers, and from that perspective, to help them choose the 
products/services that correspond the best to their preferences30. This view 
has been advanced by authors close to the Chicago School of economics31. 
Telser, a proponent of that view, argued that ‘advertising is frequently a 
means of entry and a sign of competition’, in view of its role as ‘an important 
source of information’ for consumers32.More importantly, although Telser 
recognizes that ‘firms which have some monopoly power are more likely to 
advertise because they can obtain most of the increased sales stimulated by 
their advertising’, he also finds a weak correlation between concentration or 
stable market shares and advertising, thus questioning the causal link earlier 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. See also, BJ. Bronnenberg, S.K. Dhar,J.-P.H.. Dubé, Brand History, Geography, and 
the Persistence of Brand Shares, Journal of Political Economy, 117(1) (2009), 87–115. Yet, 
these preference are shaped during a considerable period of time. 
28
 N. Economides, The Economics of Trademarks, Trademark Reporter, vol. 78 (July-August 
1988), 523-539. 
29
 Although one should also note that even under the informative view, advertising can be a 
barrier to entry, as in any case it involves firms spending a lot of money to “inform” customers 
rather than “persuade” them. Yet, this approach acknowledges the social value of these 
additional expenses, thus attempting to justify the possible barriers to entry that may emerge 
from advertising. 
30
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, p. 16. 
31
 G.J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, Journal of Political Economy, 69 (1961),, 213-
25. 
32
 L.G. Telser, L. G., Advertising and Competition, Journal of Political Economy, 72 (1964),, 
537-62, 558. 
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made by the proponents of the persuasive view33. Nelson also advances an 
informative view argument by distinguishing between search goods (whose 
quality can be determined prior to purchase, even if at high costs) and 
experience goods (whose quality can only be determined after consumption) 
and observing the benefits of advertising (and enhanced product 
differentiation) for experience goods (through the provision of indirect 
information on the product)34. Advertising constitutes a way for the firms to 
signal to consumers that they are the most efficient (low-cost) firms, since 
they seek demand expansion (the ‘signalling-efficiency effect’ of advertising). 
Furthermore, ‘(a)dvertising increases the probability of a consumer’s 
remembering the name of a brand’, and therefore advertising assists the 
consumer by informing his choice (‘the match-products-to-buyers effect). 
Hence, advertising, as well as any mechanism of product differentiation (such 
as branding) stimulate price comparisons and therefore price competition. 
Finally, advertising, and brands in general, assist the consumer to draw 
positive associations between specific products and quality, reminding them 
of their previous experience with the product (‘the repeat-business effect’)35.  
 
The ‘complementary view’ represents the third tradition in the economics of 
advertising, of relevance to our study36. Under this view, ‘consumers possess 
stable preferences, and advertising directly enters these preferences in a 
manner that is complementary to the consumption of the advertised product’, 
as consumer values ‘social prestige’ and ‘advertising by a firm may be an 
input that contributed toward the prestige that is enjoyed when the firm’s 
products is consumed’37. Inspired by the Chicago School ‘informative view’, 
the ‘complementary view’ takes for granted the preferences of consumers for 
‘social prestige’ and argues that consumer utility in this case derives from the 
consumption of various commodities, advertising or brand image being one of 
them. Advertising does not alter consumer preferences but ‘instead enters as 
an argument in a stable utility function’38. Hence, it is possible that ‘firms may 
compete in the same commodity (e.g. prestige) market even though they 
produce different market goods (e.g. jewelry and fashion) and advertise at 
different levels)’39. Hence, even uninformative advertising or branding may be 
                                                          
33
 Ibid., 544. 
34
 P. Nelson, P, Advertising as Information, Journal of Political Economy, 82 (1974),, 729-54, 
732-34. 
35
 Ibid. 
36
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, p. 20, citing the work of  G.J. 
Stigler and G. S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, American Economic Review, 67 
(1977), 76-90; L.M. Nichols, Advertising and Economic Welfare, American Economic Review, 
75 (1985), 213-8. 
37
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, pp. 20-1. 
38
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, p. 143. 
39
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, p. 21. Households act in order 
to maximize their utility. This involves the reconciliation of their preference ordering (or utility 
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beneficial to consumers, as consumers value directly the ‘social prestige’ 
image that this generates, which is part of their utility function.  
 
Yet, one may advance the familiar distinction between marginal and 
inframarginal consumers to partly counter this argument40. Marginal 
consumers value the additional ‘social prestige’ provided by the 
manufacturer’s expenses on advertising or more generally the branding of the 
product, hence they may switch to the specific product/service from other 
products/services with which the specific supplier competes in the market for 
‘social prestige’. Inframarginal consumers do not value these additional 
expenses and the additional ‘social prestige’ these may generate, as they 
value the product as such more than the commodity of ‘prestige’. 
Manufacturers may thus consider only marginal consumers and ignore 
inframarginal consumers, depending on whether the demand curve shifts with 
this additional investment on the prestige commodity and whether that 
consumer surplus generated is captured by the consumers that value ‘social 
prestige’41. Consequently, for inframarginal consumers, the additional ‘social 
prestige’ investment will not correspond to their preferences. However, the 
use of large amounts of data created on the Internet, including to some extent 
revelation of consumer preferences, can increase the category of marginal 
consumers, as opposed to that of inframarginal consumers42. 
 
One could also refer to the issues raised by Veblen goods. Veblen, among 
others, has put emphasis on the phenomenon of ‘conspicuous 
consumption’43, which brings attention to the role interpersonal effects have 
on utility functions or the need to focus on the inner motivations of 
consumers44. Leibenstein proceeded to a classification of consumer demand 
for goods and services according to the motivation behind consumer’s 
demand. He distinguished between ‘functional demand’, which refers to the 
‘part of the demand for a commodity which is due to the qualities inherent in 
                                                                                                                                                                      
function) with their given budget (income). The budget constraint, along with the agent’s 
preferences, provide the necessary information required to determine the consumption bundle 
that would maximize the agent’s utility up to a tangency point, which indicates that there is no 
possibility of increasing utility by moving along the budget constraint. Taking into account this 
budget constraint, a ‘social prestige’ preference may be satisfied by different products, 
associated with social prestige because of their brand, advertising etc, the idea here being 
that ‘preference are ordered over characteristics, not over goods’: L.M. Nichols, Advertising 
and Economic Welfare, American Economic Review, 75 (1985), 213-8, 213. 
40
 W. S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust 
Policy, Harvard Law Review, 98 (1985) 983. One should not however ignore the possibility 
that firms make investments on advertising in order to credibly ‘signal’ product quality where 
this is hard to observe. 
41
 Although one should also take into account instances of non-functional demand, such as 
“bandwagon effects” and “snob effects”, which may relativize the importance of the distinction 
between marginal and inframarginal consumers in certain contexts. These effects are 
explored in the next paragraph. 
42
 I am indebted to Nick Economides for making this last point. 
43
 T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (New York: Macmillan, 1899). 
44
 H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers 
Demand, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64 (1950), 183-207. 
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the commodity’, and ‘non-functional demand’, which is ‘the portion of the 
demand for a consumers' good which is due to factors other than the qualities 
inherent in the commodity’45. This relates to ‘utility derived from the 
commodity is enhanced or decreased owing to the fact that others are 
purchasing and consuming the same commodity, or owing to the fact that the 
commodity bears a higher rather than a lower price tag’46. This non-functional 
demand may take different forms: (i) the ‘bandwagon effect’, which refers to 
‘the extent to which the demand for a commodity is increased due to the fact 
that others are also consuming the same commodity’; (ii) the ‘snob effect’, 
which refers to the ‘extent to which the demand for a consumers' good is 
decreased owing to the fact that others are also consuming the same 
commodity (or that others are increasing their consumption of that 
commodity)’ and finally, (iii) the ‘Veblen effect’ which refers to ‘the 
phenomenon of conspicuous consumption,  to the extent to which the demand 
for a consumers' good is increased because it bears a higher rather than a 
lower price’, which is different from the ‘snob effect’ in the sense that it is a 
function of price, and not of the consumption of others47. Typical Veblen 
goods are luxury products for which brand differentiation constitutes an 
important asset. Leibenstein found that if ‘the Veblen effect is the predominant 
one, the demand curve is less elastic than otherwise, and some portions of it 
may even be positively inclined’48, hence showing that higher prices may in 
some instances correspond to the preferences of consumers.  
 
The decision to intervene in this context will therefore depend on the view one 
takes of product differentiation and its relation with the real preferences of the 
consumers. Those adept of the informative and/or the complementary view(s) 
will emphasize the value of product differentiation as an instrument to promote 
consumer welfare and consumer choice. The positive stance of the 
‘informative’ and the ‘complementary’ views over advertising and brand 
differentiation was also echoed by other work focusing on the fact that product 
differentiation often responds to the heterogeneity of consumer demand49 and 
on the need to reward ‘pioneering brands’ for risk bearing innovation50. Those 
adept of the persuasive view will be more reticent to intervene in order to 
ensure that consumer welfare is preserved and that consumers are offered a 
choice that corresponds to their individual preferences. Behavioural 
economics or neuro-economics research has also highlighted how 
‘affective/hot-mode’ decision-making, encompassing emotions and 
motivational drives may alter consumers’ tastes and create brand loyalty, in 
comparison to a counterfactual where decision-making would have been 
                                                          
45
 Ibid., 189. 
46
 Ibid., 189. 
47
 Ibid., 189. 
48
 Ibid., 207. 
49
 K.J. Lancaster, Socially Optimal Product Differentiation, The American Economic Review, 
65(4), 567-85. 
50
 R. Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands, The American 
Economic Review, 72(3) (1982),, 349-65. 
 13 
 
entirely based on the deliberative effort of consumers to maximize their 
objective function, as this derives from their ‘cold-state’ preferences51. A 
regulator inspired by paternalistic objectives would strive in this case to 
ensure that brand differentiation responds to the ‘cold-state’ preferences of 
the consumers rather than instigated by ‘hot-mode’ decision-making. 
However, it remains difficult to distinguish, outside the laboratory, what 
constitutes a ‘hot-state’ or a ‘cold-state’ preference. Furthermore, a systematic 
reliance on some form of objective list of preferences that might reasonably 
be expected to promote an agent’s well-being may be antithetical to the 
theoretical premises of mainstream competition law to rely on markets and 
revealed preferences through market behaviour, unless one takes a different 
paradigm relying on some form of soft paternalism, which is still uncharted 
territory in the area of competition law52. 
 
Addressing the issue of consumer preferences does not constitute the only 
challenge that brand differentiation sets to competition law. The development 
of brands was initially instrumental to the emergence of manufacturer market 
power, as through the constitution of brand loyalty manufacturers were able to 
foster direct relations with the consumers, without the intermediary of the 
middlemen (e.g. wholesalers, retailers), thus reversing the balance of power 
between the two poles of the vertical/distribution chain in favour of the 
manufacturers. Previously, products sold in retail stores were most often non-
branded, access to a well-known retailer being the only way for a specific 
supplier to reach the consumers. Advertising and other tools of product 
differentiation may thus be perceived as an effort to re-balance the 
relationship between manufacturers and retailers, shifting power to the 
manufacturers53. The growth in manufacturer advertising, by substituting for 
retail service, and the associated phenomenon of the multiplication of brands, 
has nevertheless facilitated over time the emergence of a more concentrated 
retail market54. Multi-brand retailers have emerged as a focal point of 
distribution in certain product categories55. Furthermore, retailers have 
developed private labels, which have increased their retail gross margins and 
have eaten market share from some national brand owners, thus intensifying 
the “vertical competition” between the two poles of the vertical chain56. 
                                                          
51
 K. Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising, Discussion paper No. 0506-01, 
Columbia University, Department of Economics, August 2005, pp. 143-46. 
52
 R.A. Thaler and C. Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism, The American Economic Review, 
93(2) (2003), 175-79.Most of the work on soft paternalism is in the area of regulation. 
53
 See, for instance, the work of R. Steiner, The Inverse Association Between Margins of 
Manufacturers and Retailers, Review of Industrial Organization, 8 (1993),, 717-40.  
54
 R.L. Steiner, Marketing Productivity in Consumer Goods Industries - A Vertical Perspective, 
Journal of Marketing, 42 (1978),, 60-70. 
55
 W. Comanor and P. Rey, Vertical Restraints and the Market Power of Large Distributors, 
Review of Industrial Organization, 17 (2000), 135. 
56
 Retailers with strong private labels have more leverage with manufacturers and this helps 
them to increase their gross margins. Private labels may also enhance consumer loyalty to 
retail brands and therefore reinforce the horizontal market power of the retailers. This will in 
turn strengthen the retailers’ vertical bargaining power against national brand manufacturers 
and will enable them to obtain better deals that will increase their profits; R L Steiner, The 
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Contrary to what was usually the case with the use of brands in the past, 
private labels often indicate the presence of a lower-price substitute to 
national brands. They illustrate that brands and product differentiation may 
take two different directions: either enable the firm to increase the price of the 
product and indicate higher quality for consumers likely to value this 
parameter of competition, or to signal the presence of a low-cost alternative, 
for consumers that are more attentive to the price parameter of competition. 
The development of brands linked to low-cost retail products (e.g. Lidl, Aldi), 
low-cost airlines (e.g. Ryanair), or more generally the launching of ‘fighter 
brands’ indicate the multiple uses and effects of brands in a business context. 
 
Last but not least, the emergence of ‘social branding’, promotes the idea that 
brands communicate vital consumer meaning and that consumers and brand 
owners are interdependent to the extent that brands are connected, 
networked and socialized. The result is that people and communities identify 
with the brands they use and become co-creators to a certain extent of the 
brand meaning, along with the brand owner. This perception of branding 
breaks with the ‘broadcast’ or ‘one-way information transmission model’ of the 
persuasive/informative/complementary views and perceives branding as a 
‘dialogic and iterative’ interaction between active consumers and brand 
owners57. Iconic brands resonate with the identity of large groups of 
consumers and lead to the formation of ‘brand communities’ that display 
brand loyalty but which also expect that this loyalty will not be betrayed by the 
brand-owner, whose discretion as brand manager is restricted by the broader 
values and reference points of the specific brand community58. The perception 
that brands are co-created by consumers and manufacturers or retailers 
renders more complex the discussion over the correspondence of product 
differentiation to consumer preferences and the complex interaction between 
consumer preferences and brand management by the brand owner. 
 
This complexity may explain the ambiguity of competition law, in particular EU 
competition law, to the phenomenon of branding and product differentiation. If 
one may find some illustrations of a hostile rhetoric of competition law to 
branding, it is also possible to uncover instances where the value of brands 
for consumer welfare and other objectives of EU competition law, in general, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Nature and Benefits of National Brand/Private Label Competition, Review of Industrial 
Organization, 24 [2004], 105, 106 (distinguishing between vertical competition, the 
competition between the different levels of the vertical structure, such as suppliers versus 
retailers over the sharing of the profits of the vertical chain, and horizontal competition, the 
competition between different vertical chains). 
57
 See, for instance, D.R. Desai, From Trademarks to Brands, Florida Law Review, (2012) 
981-1044, (noting the ‘noncorporate dimension of branding’ which ‘involves consumers and 
communities as stakeholders in brands’); D.S. Ganjee, Property in Brands, in H. Howe and J. 
Griffiths (eds.) Property Concepts in Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge: CUP 2013), 
Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2235721;  
58
 A.M. Munir, Jr and T.C. O’Guinn, Brand Community, Journal of Consumer Research, 27 
(2001),,412-31; D. Holt, How Brands Become Icons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2004). 
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was duly recognized. It remains however that instances of the former are 
more numerous than instances of the latter, although one has to take into 
account the fact that product differentiation is prevalent in European markets 
and that in fine few competition cases investigated are selected on this basis. 
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IMPLEMENTING THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT OF BRANDS IN EU 
COMPETITION LAW 
 
At several occasions, the European Commission and the EU courts have 
made use of the concept of brand in order to derive specific inferences in the 
context of the competition assessment of business conduct. Confirming our 
earlier findings as to the ambiguous effects of branding and more generally 
product differentiation on competition, the inferences made were not always 
going to the same direction. In some cases, product differentiation was 
perceived as a positive development that had to be preserved, by enabling 
undertakings to protect the value of their brand (brands operating as a 
competition law defence). In most cases relating to product differentiation, 
however, product differentiation was viewed with suspicion and led to findings 
of anticompetitive effects or raised concerns over restrictive to competition 
practices that had to be tackled (brands operating as a sword). Most recently, 
the phenomenon of brands came to the epicentre of the competition law 
discourse with the focus on private labels, in particular in the food sector 
industry. 
 
Brands, product differentiation and market power 
 
In theory, by driving the demand curve of branded product or service to 
become more inelastic, brands, and more generally product differentiation, 
may be considered as a source of market power, in the economic sense of 
the word: the ability to raise prices profitably and reduce output59. Yet, the 
development of low-cost brands in different economic sectors (e.g. air 
transport, clothing, food, retail services) may raise doubts as to the validity of 
this correlation. Michael Porter has observed that product differentiation and 
cost leadership ‘are usually inconsistent, because differentiation is usually 
costly’60. He remarked that firms may pursue both low cost leadership and 
product differentiation as strategy only in specific, and temporary 
circumstances, when all competitors are stuck in the middle, where cost is 
strongly affected by market shares, or when a firm introduces a major 
innovation. Other researchers have nevertheless emphasized the 
sustainability of the strategy of combining product differentiation and low cost 
leadership, thus explaining the successful emergence of low-cost brands61 . 
Hill has shown the benefits of differentiation as a way of achieving a low-cost 
position in certain market configurations, such as high growing emerging 
industries that have significant learning and scale economies and the potential 
to differentiate the product, or mature industries experiencing significant 
                                                          
59
 This does not mean that branding will always drive the demand curve to become more 
inelastic. It may also increase demand. 
60
 M. Porter, Competitive Advantage (New York: Free Press, 1985), 18. 
61
 Charles W. L. Hill, Differentiation versus Low Cost or Differentiation and Low Cost: A 
Contingency Framework, The Academy of Management Review, 13(3) (1988), 401-12;  
 17 
 
technological change, which gives rise to new learning economies62. Major 
traditional ‘quality-focused’ brands are also launching low-cost ‘no-frills’ 
brands as a way to compete with mono ‘low-cost’ brands63. This increased 
product or service differentiation augments the elasticity of the demand curve 
and increases consumer choice. 
 
The complex interrelation between low-cost and ‘quality-focused’ brands has 
not yet been thoroughly considered in EU competition law, which adheres to 
the assumption that brands and product differentiation lead to a more inelastic 
demand curve64. The objective of the firm   may indeed be to use product 
differentiation (in variety or quality) to create a firm-specific demand curve that 
is more inelastic than the industry-wide demand curve. Competition 
authorities have relied occasionally on the inelastic demand curve of after-
sales services or replacement equipment markets to define the brand as the 
relevant market, with the aim to protect from exploitation consumers that were 
‘locked in’ the specific brand. Although these cases concern after-markets, 
with the presence of information imperfections and asymmetries between 
sellers and purchasers, and the brands involved are not household names, 
they illustrate that in certain circumstances, competition authorities and courts 
may define brands as a relevant market in order to protect consumers “locked 
in” a specific brand in certain contexts. 
 
For instance, in Hugin a Swedish company having at the time 13 percent of 
the United Kingdom market for such registers was found by the Commission 
to have abused its dominant position for refusing to supply spare parts to its 
former exclusive distributor in the UK, which were needed to repair and 
maintain the large numbers of Hugin cash registers that it rented. Hugin had 
argued that the relevant market was to be ‘cash registers’ as a whole. The 
Court rejected this view and held instead that spare parts were separate 
products from the original equipment supplied, with the result that the relevant 
market was found to comprise only Hugin spare parts required by the 
independent undertakings repairing and servicing Hugin cash registers. By 
distinguishing the secondary market of spare parts from the primary market of 
the cash registers, the Court was able to ignore the possible competitive 
constraints that could be exercised on the conduct of the undertaking by its 
competitors on the primary market to which the independent retailers may 
have shifted their business. No justification was provided for such finding and 
                                                          
62
 Charles W. L. Hill, Differentiation versus Low Cost or Differentiation and Low Cost: A 
Contingency Framework, The Academy of Management Review, 13(3) (1988), 401-12, 411. 
63
 In the air transport sector, see, for instance, the plans of German carrier Lufhansa to launch 
in collaboration with Turkish Airlines a low-cost long haul carrier: 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-09/lufthansa-to-expand-low-cost-push-as-spohr-mulls-
long-haul-model.html  
64
 See, for instance, the classic CJEU judgment in Case C-27/76 United Brands v. 
Commission (Chiquita) E.C.R., 1978, I-207 (where the brand was considered as enhancing 
United Brands’ dominant position). 
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the Court did not elaborate further as it found that the conduct did not affect 
trade between Member States.  
 
The Commission set the principles of its aftermarkets analysis in its 
Pelikan/Kyoecera, Info-Lab/Ricoh and EFIM decisions, relating to complaints 
regarding the market for toners for printers and toners for photocopiers65. In 
its Notice on market definition the Commission explained this approach by 
noting the need when defining a market not only to assess the responses of 
customers based on their purchasing decisions when relative prices change, 
but also constraints on substitution imposed by conditions in the connected 
markets66. If the issue of compatibility between the spare parts and the 
primary product is important for consumers and the primary product has a 
long lifespan, there might be the risk that charging higher prices to the ‘locked 
in’ the brand customers may be a profitable strategy, hence leading to the 
definition of a narrow secondary product market (e.g. spare parts, after-sales 
services). However, according to the Commission’s Notice, ‘a different market 
definition may result if significant substitution between secondary products is 
possible or if the characteristics of the primary products make quick and direct 
consumer responses to relative price increases of the secondary products 
feasible’. As it is further explained in the Commission’s vertical restraints 
guidelines,  
 
(i)n practice, the issue to decide is whether a significant proportion of 
buyers make their choice taking into account the lifetime costs of the 
product. If so, this indicates there is one market for the original 
equipment and spare parts combined67. 
 
Traditionally economic analysis on after-markets has emphasized whether 
consumers ‘full cost’ at the outset in order to distinguish between the different 
cases68. A similar approach was adopted by the US Supreme Court in 
                                                          
65
 Case No. IV/34.330 - Pelikan/Kyocera, (1995) para. 6, (noting that the Commission will 
consider the following four elements: “the extent that a customer (i) can make an informed 
choice including lifecycle-pricing, knowing of the warranty restrictions of the various 
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apparent policy of exploitation being pursued in one specific aftermarket, a (iii) sufficient 
number of customers would adapt their purchasing behavior at the level of the primary market 
(iv) within a reasonable time”; Case No. IV/E 2?36.431 – Info-Lab/Ricoh (1999), paras 37 et 
seq.; Case Case COMP/C-3/39.391 EFIM, C(2009) 4125, para. 16; For cases where similar 
issues were raised see, Commission Decision 91/595/EEC in Case No IV/M.12 — 
Varta/Bosch, OJ L 320, 22.11.1991, p. 26, Commission Decision in Case No IV/M.1094 — 
Caterpillar/Perkins Engines, OJ C 94, 28.3.1998, p. 23, and Commission Decision in Case No 
IV/M.768 — Lucas/Varity, OJ C 266, 13.9.1996, p. 6. 
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 Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law, [1997] OJ C 37/5, para. 56. 
67
 Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, [2010] C 130/1, para. 91. See also, DG 
Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary 
abuses (2005), paras 257-258 (focusing on switching costs for customers to shift their 
demand to another primary product). 
68
 See, P. Davis, L. Coppi and P. Kalmus, “The Economics of Secondary Product Markets”, 
OFT Discussion. Paper (2012). 
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Eastman Kodak, which has been perceived as animated by post-Chicago 
principles that market imperfections (e.g. information imperfections) may lead 
‘unsophisticated’ market participants to be exploited in aftermarkets for 
products they are locked in, even if the primary market is competitive69. In its 
most recent case law, the CJEU confirmed the approach followed by the 
Commission in after-market cases70. 
 
Because of their characteristics and lifespan, some products may be 
particularly conducive to such form of exploitation of market power. In this 
context, the EU Courts and the Commission have either found that the 
specific brand may constitute the relevant market, or have examined 
thoroughly the anticompetitive effects on the ‘locked-in’ customers, the brand 
therefore becoming an operational concept in the competition law 
assessment. For instance, one may understand the Volvo and Renault 
judgments of the CJEU as relying on the assumption that the spare parts of 
each of these automobile manufacturers could be considered as a separate 
relevant market from that of the primary product, the automobile, the refusal to 
deliver by Volvo and Renault of these spare parts to independent repairers 
constituting an abuse of a dominant position71. More importantly, in its Motor 
Vehicle Distribution Regulation and guidelines, the Commission defines a 
separate relevant market for the repair and parts of each brand, thus 
conceiving the after-sales market as a separate market than the primary 
one72. According to the Commission, ‘(b)ecause of the generally brand-
specific nature of the markets for repair and maintenance services and for the 
distribution of spare parts, competition on those markets is inherently less 
intense compared to that on the market for the sale of new motor vehicle’73. 
Furthermore, concerns over the exploitation of locked in consumers may also 
be justified by the fact that ‘repair and maintenance as a whole represent a 
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 Eastman Kodak Co v. Image Technical Services, Inc, 504 US 451 (1992). The judgment of 
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very high proportion of total consumer expenditure on motor vehicles, which 
itself accounts for a significant slice of the average consumer’s budget’74. 
 
The vertical restraints guidelines summarize this tradition of hostility of EU 
competition law towards branding power by stipulating that 
 
(v)ertical restraints agreed for non-branded goods and services are in 
general less harmful than restraints affecting the distribution of branded 
goods and services. Branding tends to increase product differentiation 
and reduce substitutability of the product, leading to a reduced 
elasticity of demand and an increased possibility to raise price75. 
 
Brands are considered in several parts of the guidelines as indicating the 
existence of market power of the brand-owner and as barriers to entry76. 
 
EU competition law has not, however, gone as far as developing a full-fledged 
theory of relational (or superior bargaining) market power, on the basis of the 
‘economic dependence’ that some retailers may have on a well-known strong 
brand or group of brands, even if the supplier does not dispose of a high 
enough market share to be found in a dominant position or providing him the 
ability to exercise market power, as it is the case in the competition law of 
some Member States (e.g. in German competition law:’sortimentsbedingte 
Abhängigkeit’ or brand dependence)77. For instance, in the famous Rossignol 
case, the German Federal Court (BGH) found that because of its commercial 
value and its market prestige, there were not sufficient switching possibilities 
for the customers of Rossignol ski equipment, here a leading specialised sport 
retailer, even if there was considerable competition between Rossignol skis 
and other suppliers78. In particular, the Federal Court noted that, in addition to 
their price, the actual value of particular goods is determined by their quality 
and the producer’s advertising activities, hence hinting to the role of product 
differentiation in providing some degree of (relative) market power. Although 
brands have been considered as reinforcing the finding of a dominant 
position, the European Commission and EU courts do not apply Article 102 
TFEU on the simple basis of switching costs for consumers engendered by 
the appeal and reputation of a brand, in the absence of a dominant position 
on the relevant market. 
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Product differentiation plays nevertheless a more active role in EU merger 
control, in view of the recent emphasis put on unilateral (non-coordinated) 
effects theory and a significant impediment of effective competition below the 
levels of dominance79. In all these cases the merging firms may find it 
profitable to alter their behaviour unilaterally, following the acquisition, by 
elevating the price and suppressing output and by acting independently of the 
remaining firms. Econometric techniques used in the context of differentiated 
products in order to assess these effects take also into account the multiple 
dimensions of consumer choice, as the parameters of the choice increase 
with the number of products considered. The literature provides different 
solutions regarding the existence of various dimensions of product 
competition (the dimensionality problem)80: (i) multi-level demand models, (ii) 
spatial models, and (iii) discrete choice models. Multi-level demand models, 
as well as spatial models, attempt to solve the dimensionality problem by 
dividing the products into smaller groups or sub-groups. The demand system 
applied has the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) model formulation, 
under which it is assumed that consumers employ a multi-level decision 
making process when purchasing a product. The actual application usually 
involves a three stage system (although it is possible to have as many levels 
as necessary)81: the top level corresponds to overall demand for the product 
(for example, ready-to-eat cereal); the middle level involves demand for 
different market segments (for example, family, kids and adults cereal); and 
the bottom level involves a flexible brand demand system corresponding to 
the competition between the different brands within each segment. The 
discrete choice models take a more fundamental approach and project 
consumer preferences over the products' characteristics rather than the 
products themselves. 
 
Nested logit models have also been used in order to examine the competitive 
interaction between brands in markets with differentiated products. In 
Unilever/Sara Lee, which concerned the sale of branded deodorants in a 
range of EU countries, the Commission estimated one and two-level nested 
logit models for deodorants, with nests for male and non-male deodorants, 
and sub-nests depending on whether the deodorant was presented as skin 
friendly. The Commission then combined the estimated elasticities of demand 
with standard supply-side assumptions (i.e., static Bertrand competition) to 
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simulate the price effects of the merger. The nested logit model used relied 
overall on simplifying assumptions, a crucial feature of which is that within 
each nest, switching between individual brands is proportional to brand 
market share. Hence, the Commission employed in this case a two-level nest 
structure, which subdivided the male and non-male deodorants according to 
some further product characteristic, that is whether or not the male or non-
male deodorants are branded as being ‘skin-friendly’, thus reducing reliance 
on market shares, as the assumption that consumers switch between 
products in proportion to market shares is limited to a narrower product set 
(e.g. non-male skin friendly deodorants). Yet, even with this modification, the 
nested logit model failed to take into account important aspects of 
differentiation across brands (such as the format of the deodorant roll-on 
versus aerosol, fragrance etc)82.  The model could not thus identify the 
competitive interaction between brands within each category, as the 
simulation relied on estimates of substitution across all brands. It did not also 
include elements of dynamic competition, such as entry, product repositioning 
or retailer buyer power. The Commission recognized these limitations of the 
simulation method, yet it considered that the ‘estimated effects are consistent 
with the rest of the available evidence and of a sufficient magnitude to be 
assigned a certain weight in the analysis’83. It is noted in the decision that 
given the time frame of the investigation, it would have been prohibitively 
complex to introduce these additional factors into the model and the 
assessment was carried out by using the other qualitative and quantitative 
evidence on file84. Hence, there may be limits to a more systematic analysis of 
brands and their competitive interaction in this context. 
 
One may conclude from the above that EU competition law seems to perceive 
branding as reducing elasticity of demand (and consumer switching), 
establishing barriers to entry and thus facilitating the exercise of market power 
to the detriment of consumers’ welfare or choice. Yet, this tradition co-exists 
with a more positive perspective on the role of brands in promoting 
competition and the interest of consumers. 
 
Product differentiation and brands as a defence tool 
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The Metro I judgment of the CJEU is particularly significant for emphasizing 
the important role of competition on quality and variety, rather than 
competition only based on the parameter of price. The Court held compatible 
to Article 101 TFEU the constitution of selective distribution networks, to 
which only dealers satisfying some objective, qualitative and proportional 
criteria will be accepted85. The CJEU declared that ‘although price competition 
is so important that it can never be eliminated it does not constitute the only 
effective form of competition or that to which absolute priority must in all 
circumstances be accorded’86. Following this judgment, as a matter of 
principle, product differentiation leading to higher prices would not be deemed 
anticompetitive in EU competition law if it has the effect to increase the level 
of competition on other parameters than price, such as quality, product variety 
and innovation87. This hospitable tradition to product differentiation and 
consequently branding may lead to the finding that some restrictions of price 
competition may not infringe Article 101 TFEU if they aim to promote the 
brand image of the product (thus increasing product variety) and its overall 
quality.  
 
The CJEU has accepted that restricting the number or types of retailers in a 
selective distribution framework may be a necessary evil in order to create a 
brand image, should the nature of the product justify such investment88. 
Similarly, the Court recognized the specific characteristics of franchise 
agreements in Pronuptia89, where it held that a franchisor should have the 
freedom to select his franchisees and to impose on them the obligation to 
obtain the contract products only from a designated source when it is not 
possible to formulate objective quality specifications, or more generally 
obligations as to the nature of any advertising and promotion of the products. 
These restraints broadly rely on the need to protect the brand reputation of 
the franchise network. Indeed, a common feature of franchise contracts is the 
transfer of intellectual property rights (trademark) and know-how from the 
franchisor to the franchisee. This may create a risk of ex post opportunism. 
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Indeed, ‘if one franchisee allows the quality of his establishment to 
deteriorate, he benefits by the full amount of the savings from reduced quality 
maintenance’ but ‘he loses only part of the costs, for part is borne by other 
franchisees’90. It follows that the franchisor will have to select his franchisees 
carefully, institute a quality control mechanism, introduce early termination 
clauses in the franchising agreement and impose further restrictions 
necessary for the protection of the identity and reputation of the network and 
the value of the assets, such as the trademark, which are also used by the 
other members of the franchise network. 
 
More generally, EU competition law recognizes that 
 
(a) vertical restraint may help to create a brand image by imposing a 
certain measure of uniformity and quality standardisation on the 
distributors, thereby increasing the attractiveness of the product to the 
final consumer and increasing its sales91. 
This does not go, however, as far as accepting that the protection of brand 
image and the promotion of the brand constitutes a justification for any type of 
anticompetitive conduct. Already in Consten & Grundig, the CJEU ignored the 
possible positive effects to inter-brand competition of the strategy of the 
German brand of electrical equipment Grundig to offer an exclusive 
distributions agreement to French distributor Consten, coupled with a 
trademark license agreement for France, because of its potential to affect 
intra-EU trade and parallel imports with the establishment of an absolute 
territorial protection92. The Court did not consider the possibility that such 
territorial protection could be the only way for a not well-known brand to gain 
access to the market of another Member State93. The possibility for new, not 
so well-known, brands to impose restrictions of passive sales by other 
distributors into an exclusive territory or to an exclusive customer group, has 
nevertheless been accepted by both the CJEU94 and the European 
Commission95, when it is necessary for the distributor to recoup the 
substantial investments that need to be made, where there was previously no 
demand for that type of product in general or for that type of product from that 
producer in particular.  
 
However, the recent case law of the CJEU and the decisional practice of 
some national competition authorities on the prohibition of online sales in the 
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context of a selective distribution network reminds us that, in the presence of 
hardcore restrictions, it is not possible to successfully rely on the need to 
protect brand image as a competition law defence96. More generally, the 
CJEU held in Pierre Fabre, that ‘(t)he aim of maintaining a prestigious image 
is not a legitimate aim for restricting competition and cannot therefore justify a 
finding that a contractual clause pursuing such an aim does not fall within 
Article 101(1) TFEU’97. One may think these broad restrictions as based on 
some form of industrial policy aims to develop an e-commerce or m-
commerce that is not entirely at the hands of brand manufacturers and to 
provide possibilities for innovative, low-cost, distributors emerging, or more 
simply as a way to enhance the opportunities of parallel trade. The vertical 
restraints guidelines attempt nevertheless to reach a balance between these 
different objectives by recognizing the possibility of a supplier to require that 
its distributors have one or more brick and mortar shops or showrooms as a 
condition for becoming a member of its distribution system98. 
 
Private labels and the emergence of a new rhetoric on brands  
 
The development of private labels, as well as that of ‘low-cost’ brands, 
challenges the premise that branding and product differentiation render the 
demand more inelastic and hence lead to higher prices for consumers. Private 
label is a term referring to all products sold under a retailer’s brand, which 
could be the retailer’s own name (store brands) or a brand created by a 
manufacturer exclusively for the retailer, who defines the characteristics of the 
product (generic brands). Private label products are generally exclusively 
distributed by the retailer along with national brand products, which are 
marketed by manufacturers throughout the national market, not only in the 
specific retailers’ outlets. Private labels usually appeal to consumers because 
of their lower price. Hence, product differentiation by private labels may 
counteract the effect of differentiation strategies employed by national brands 
suppliers who aim to increase their prices and improve their profitability. This 
brings a horizontal dimension in the relationship between suppliers and 
retailers, as private labels may compete for market share with national 
brands99. Private label brands’ market share has been constantly growing, in 
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particular in the food sector100, and represents a significant volume of retail 
sales in Europe. From simple generics in the 1970s, private labels’ quality has 
considerably improved in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
Private labels are generally perceived by consumers as being of lower price 
and quality than national brands. In addition, national labels benefit from a 
‘reputation premium’, as a result of more extensive advertising than private 
labels and brand loyalty building. This leads to lower prices for private labels 
than equivalent, in terms of quality, national brand products. Despite this retail 
price differential, retailer’s gross margins for private labels are more important 
in comparison to national brand products101. It follows that the 
commercialisation of private labels is more profitable for the retailers, in 
comparison to national brands. 
 
This constitutes the main reason for the introduction of private labels by 
retailers and leads often to the exclusion of second-tier national brands from 
the market102. Two reasons explain the higher retail gross margins for 
retailers. Steiner notes that retailers with strong private labels have more 
leverage with manufacturers and this helps them to increase their retail gross 
margins, compared to what they would have been in the absence of strong 
private labels103. Private labels may also enhance consumer loyalty to retail 
brands and therefore reinforce the horizontal market power of the retailers. 
This will in turn strengthen the retailers’ vertical bargaining power against 
national brand manufacturers and will enable them to obtain better deals that 
will increase their profits104. These distributional effects are ambiguous from 
the point of view of the consumers. Steiner observes the generally positive 
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effect of competition between private labels and national brands, what he calls 
the ‘mixed regimen’: 
 
(i)n this structure a group of (national brands) receive vigorous 
competition from the (private labels) of the major chain retailers—
contest that tends to maximize social welfare in consumer goods 
industries. That is, it brings about a high level of total surplus while also 
stimulating innovation by manufacturers. It produces these benefits 
because of a combination of horizontal and vertical relationships that 
are unique to this structure105. 
 
The commercialization of private labels obviously increases consumer choice 
by offering a lower price substitute to the consumers. The system may also 
introduce an effective countervailing power for retailers against the market 
power of national brand owners. Nevertheless, private labels may also 
produce important anti-competitive effects, in particular if they finish by 
dominating the market. First, they may increase retail prices for consumers. 
Private labels will increase search costs for consumers and will therefore offer 
the opportunity for a higher mark-up at the supply or retail level. 
 
Empirical studies have also showed that competition from private labels might 
not lead to lower prices for national brand products106. Consumers with a high 
degree of loyalty to the manufacturer’s brand will not benefit from the 
introduction of private label products: 
 
(t)he trade-off for the national brand producer facing a private label is 
between exploiting the loyal consumers with a high price and 
competing for the switching consumers with a lower price. When the 
fraction of loyals is high, the national brand will concentrate on the loyal 
segment and a private label will be introduced at a lower price. On the 
other hand, when the fraction of loyals is relatively low, the national 
brand finds it optimal to offer an exclusivity contract to the retailer at a 
low price and no private label is introduced . . . If the national brand 
producer serves both loyal and switching consumers initially, the price 
of the national brand will be relatively low. In such a situation private 
label competition would lead to an increase in the price of the national 
brand. The reason is that the national brand producer decides not to 
serve the switching consumers to which the private label is offered and 
instead sets a high price to serve only loyal consumers . . . Loyal 
consumers are worse off due to a higher price on the national brand, 
while switching consumers are better off when offered a low-price 
private label. It turns out that in some cases consumers on aggregate 
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benefit from private label introduction, in other cases they are worse 
off107. 
 
It follows that the effect of private labels on consumers is ambiguous and 
largely depends on the characteristics of consumer demand for the specific 
product. Restricting the commercial freedom of retailers may have, depending 
on the circumstances, a positive or a negative welfare effect for consumers. 
 
Second, because of the gatekeeper role of the retailers, consumer choice and 
product variety may be affected if private labels exclude all but the leading 
national brands. As the European Commission remarked in its merger 
decision Procter & Gamble/Gillette, 
 
(i)f a retailer refused to carry a brand of the parties, the brand would 
risk disappearing from the customers’ awareness. As a consequence, it 
would be detrimental to a leading brand of the parties to be excluded 
from a major retailer for a longer period, as it would entail significant 
losses in customer awareness, whilst the costs would be relatively 
minor for the retailer (whose sales with this brand represent only a 
small fraction of its turnover). It should also be noted that the parties’ 
overall sales represent on average not more than 2% of the retailers’ 
sales, while for the parties certain retailers represent 10% and more of 
the sales in a given country. 
 
The Commission, however, also noted that this is unlikely to happen in 
practice as leading national brands (‘must-stock brands’) may play a role of 
quality certification for the retailer in inter-store competition. Private labels 
change the power relation between suppliers and retailers to the benefit of the 
later. The retailers establish their control over the suppliers, which see no 
reason to develop their own brands and finally are marginalised as 
independent players in the market (they could still supply goods for the 
retailers’ private labels).  
 
It is not clear what will be the effects of private labels for innovation. Copycat 
packaging is an important concern for suppliers of national brands and may 
lead to fewer investments for R&D and less innovation. Private labels may 
also be a source of buyer power, which in certain circumstances, if it is 
associated with selling power, may produce anticompetitive effects. 
 
Commission Regulation 330/2010 on vertical agreements applies only in 
situations where the undertakings are competing distributors, for example 
independent retailers competing with supplier-owned outlets, but does not 
cover the situations where the supplier and the retailer are competing 
manufacturers. This excludes from the scope of the block exemption 
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situations where the retailer sells private labels that compete with the national 
brand of a supplier, except in circumstances where the distributor provides 
specifications to a manufacturer to produce particular goods under the 
distributor’s brand name and both parties conclude a sub-contracting 
agreement. The existence of own brands including private labels and the 
brand image of the undertaking concerned amongst final consumers are 
elements to be considered in assessing if one of the undertaking’s customers 
possess buyer power108. Buyer power is viewed positively, as it ‘may prevent 
the parties from exercising market power and thereby solve a competition 
problem that would otherwise have existed’, which ‘is particularly so when 
strong customers have the capacity and incentive to bring new sources of 
supply on to the market in the case of a small but permanent increase in 
relative prices’. Private labels are also mentioned a second time with regard to 
category management agreements that may lead to distortions of competition, 
as ‘in most cases the distributor may not have an interest in limiting its choice 
of products, when the distributor also sells competing products under its own 
brand (private labels), the distributor may also have incentives to exclude 
certain suppliers, in particular intermediate range products’109. 
 
The issue of private labels has, and will continue to be, a central issue of the 
recent national and EU initiatives with regard to the retail supply chain and the 
emerging bargaining power gap between retailers and suppliers, in particular 
in the food-sector110. The European Commission has commissioned research 
on the effect of private labels on competitiveness, innovation and choice111, 
following up the work undertaken by some national competition authorities on 
this issue112. A ‘Task Force Food’ was put in place at the DG Competition at 
the European Commission in 2012, hinting to the possibility of competition law 
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investigations and eventually a sector enquiry in this sector. However, the 
complexity of the problems raised by unequal bargaining power between 
retailers and suppliers cannot only be solved by competition law and a more 
integrated framework is needed113, combining the enforcement of competition 
law, when there is conduct that enters its scope, including provisions on 
abuse of economic dependence in some Member States, but also unfair 
trading practices laws114, provisions of contract law and more generally civil 
law (tort law, European sales law), which aim to deal with abusive use of 
unequal bargaining power, and finally, soft law and self-regulatory initiatives 
by the industry that have emerged in several Member States115. 
 
Its seems therefore that private labels and their competitive relation with 
national brands may lead to some cross-fertilization between these different 
areas of law and the development of a more holistic paradigm of retail 
regulation that will engage more closely with the concept of brand, than what 
is currently on offer. While there are significant differences between the 
objectives of each of these different areas of law and their instruments, their 
current emphasis on retailer power, in particular its relational dimension of 
‘bargaining power, offer real opportunities to the concept of ‘brand’ to gain 
operational concept status in various areas of the law, including competition 
law. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
While not adopting a clear and unambiguous perspective on the concept of 
brand, EU competition law has engaged in multiple instances with branding 
and product differentiation. It is, however, too early to conclude if brands will 
gain operational concept status in EU competition law and if the multiple 
understandings of branding, developed by management or business studies, 
will finally make their entry in EU competition law’s sources of wisdom. The 
concerns raised by retailer power and the development of private labels 
indicate that the existing economic theory on product differentiation may not 
provide the complete picture on the effects of brands on the competitive 
process and ultimately on consumers. Competition law will also need to tackle 
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the issues raised by the development of ‘social branding’ and the dialogic 
interaction between brand owners and consumers in the constitution of their 
brand identity, which breaks with a unidirectional view of the power relations 
between brand owners and consumers. The importance of normative choices 
and assumptions on the interaction between brands and the formation of 
consumer preferences will also be a key parameter in the integration of the 
concept of brands in EU competition law and other related areas of law (e.g. 
unfair trade practices law). 
